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Abstract
This paper examines whether or not the export insurance subsidy provided
by the British government has promoted Britain.s export supply. Unlike previous studies on the effectiveness of export subsidy in export supply, the current
study examines the stationarity nature of the concerned variables. The unit root
tests show that all concerned variables are integrated of order one. According
to Johansen cointegration test, the concerned variables are not cointegrated. The
empirical evidences using the first differenced data show that the export subsidy
in terms of provision of export insurances by the government is not statistically
significant in increasing export supply.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: F13
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I.

Introduction

Although governmental assistance to private enterprises in terms of export
insurances may be regarded as subsidies to promote export, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) system has not prohibited
the provision of certain types of export insurances (Abraham, Couwenberg and Dewit
(1992); Mah and Song (2001)). If export insurances have been successful in promoting
export, the WTO Members may promote their exports by establishing or improving the
export insurance systems. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether provision of
export insurance contributes to the promotion of export.
Britain has been among the world’s active users of the export insurance system.
Since 1919, the British government has provided export insurances.

Facing higher

political risks due, for instance, to the debt crisis, exporters were able to cover risks by
export insurances especially since the early 1980s. However, few rigorous attempts have
been made to reveal empirically whether or not provision of export insurances by the
government has actually helped to promote export in Britain. This paper examines the
effectiveness of the British export insurance system in the promotion of export. The
structure of this paper is as follows. Section II explains the British export insurance
system. Section III explains the model and data. Empirical evidences are shown in
Section IV. Section V provides conclusions.

II.

The Export Insurance System in Britain

In Britain, export insurance services have been conducted by the Export Credits
Guarantee Department (ECGD) to promote export. This body aims to benefit the U.K.
economy by helping exporters of U.K. goods and services win business and U.K. firms to

invest overseas, by providing guarantees, insurance and reinsurance against loss, taking
into account the government’s international policies. It has served U.K. exporters since
1919 and U.K. investors overseas since 1972. Since privatising its short term business in
December 1991, ECGD has primarily focused on underwriting overseas investments and
capital goods and project exports to non-OECD markets. In most cases, the export
contracts involved require medium- and long-term finance.

ECGD support is not

required for the bulk of U.K. exports, such as consumer items and other goods sold on
short terms of credit; nor is it generally required for sales to rich markets, where
competitive insurance and finance services are readily available in private market.
Overall, ECGD issues guarantees and policies worth around 3 billion pounds a year and,
during 1995-1999, has underwritten 17 billion pounds of guarantees (Estrin, et al (2000),
pp. 11-16; Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) (2000), pp. 45-85).
In 2000, for instance, the amount of underwritten business shared 13 percent of
total British export, which is one of the highest in the world, compared with the other
active users such as Australia (9 percent), France (17 percent), Japan (21 percent),
Netherlands (12 percent) during 1993-1999 or Korea (17 percent) during 1998 - 2001
(NEXI (2002))).

The amount of claims paid during 1980-2000 reached 12 billion

pounds. During the same period, the number of claims divided by premium incomes
amounted to 484 percent; that is, the former was 4.8 times higher than the latter. Even if
such a loss ratio is defined as (claims payment+administrative cost) divided by (premium
incomes+recoveries), it amounted to 114 percent. The difference between expenditure
and income was compensated by the government. The Portfolio Management System
was introduced in 1991; the intention was to apply more disciplined risk management in
the wake of the 1980s debt crisis. Consequently, since 1992 premium income and
recoveries have been higher than operating costs including claims payment and
administrative cost.

Considering that Annex I.(j) of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures regards export insurance inadequate for covering the long-term
operating cost as prohibited export subsidies, the British export insurance system with
premium revenue dominating operating cost since 1992 would not be regarded as
prohibited subsidies under the WTO system.

III.

The Model and Data

International economists have devoted considerable attention to the estimation of
export supply function because of its importance in economic development. Assuming
an infinitely elastic export demand curve, the amount of export supply determines the
equilibrium export level. Besides export relative prices, export subsidy has sometimes
been studied as another determinant of export supply. Jung and Lee (1986) showed that
export relative price and export subsidies were significant in influencing export supply in
Korea.

Arslan and Wijnbergen (1993) assumed that export divided by income is

determined by current and lagged values of relative price of export and, based on the
Turkish data, showed that export subsidies had a significant, positive effect on export in
Turkey. However, their simulation analysis suggested that export subsidies were mostly
shifted backwards into higher producer profits rather than forward into lower (foreign)
consumer prices, resulting in the moderate contributions of the export subsidies to the
export boom.
Faini (1994) regressed export supply on wage, real interest rate, domestic prices,
export prices, price of investment goods and time trend capturing technical progress. His
results for Turkey and Morocco showed that capacity and export subsidy have significant
effects on export supply.

Barlow and Senses (1995) assumed export supply to be

determined by real domestic price, real wage, tariff rate, foreign capital inflow and

accumulated real investment. Their results for Turkey showed that export subsidy had a
positive and significant effect on Turkey’s export. Overall, the above-mentioned papers
based on the time series data argued that export subsidy promoted export supply;
however, since they did not consider the stationarity issue, the results from those may be
those of spurious regression.
The argument on the impact of export subsidy on export supply explained thus
far can be summarized in the following manner:

log EXPGDP(t) = a + b log RP(t) + c log ESUB(t) + e(t)

(1)

where EXPGDP = export value divided by GDP; RP = export price index divided by
wholesale price index, both expressed in terms of British pound; ESUB = 1 + export
insurance subsidy ratio (which is defined in the current paper as (export insurance claims
– export insurance premium – recovery)/export value) or (export insurance claims +
administrative cost – export insurance premium – recovery)/export value). The definition
of export insurance subsidy is controversial. For instance, NEXI in Japan defines it as
the claims paid/premium revenue. However, Bagci, et al (2003) introduces other factors
such as the administrative costs and defines the export insurance subsidy as the difference
between the ideal price and the actual price charged. Despite the effort to estimate the
equilibrium export model considering export demand equation, the author could not get
the empirical evidences due to the insufficient number of observations in the data set.
The estimated coefficient b can be interpreted as the export relative price
elasticity. The sign of the coefficient b is expected to be positive, since the higher export
price compared with domestic price would increase export supply. Since provision of
export subsidies increases profits of exporters, it would increase export supply, resulting
in c > 0. Data for EXPGDP and RP are taken from IMF, International Financial

Statistics Yearbook 2001. Data relating to export insurances are taken from Estrin, et al
(2000).
Since regression analyses using non-stationary variables may lead to spurious
regression, it is necessary to check the stationarity of the concerned variables. The
annually observed data set in the current study covers the period 1980-2000, considering
the consistency of the data. Phillips-Perron as well as augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are
performed with respect to the variables under consideration to test the stationarity. If the
concerned variables are integrated of the same order, it is necessary to check whether
there exist long run equilibrium relationship(s) between the concerned variables, using
cointegration tests. If there exist(s) at least a cointegrating vector among the concerned
variables, we can conclude that there are long run equilibrium relationship(s) between
these variables even if they are non-stationary. This paper uses Johansen's (1988, 1991)
method to test the cointegration relationship. If the cointegration test reveals that there
does not exist such a relationship, then it would be necessary to use the first differenced
data and rely on the regression analysis.

IV.

Empirical Evidences

The Phillips-Perron unit root test results show that the levels of the concerned
variables are not stationary at any reasonable level of significance. Therefore, it is
necessary to examine whether or not the first differenced forms of the concerned
variables are stationary. Optimal lags in the unit root tests are chosen by Newey-West
method. Table 1 shows that the first differenced forms of all concerned variables are
stationary at 1 to 10 percent level of significance, although their level forms are revealed
to be non-stationary at any reasonable level of significance.

The results are the same

regardless of inclusion of a trend term in the unit root test.

They do not change

qualitatively when using the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, either, which are not
reported here to save the space. Therefore, it is assumed that all concerned variables are
integrated of order one.

[Insert Table 1]

The existence of long run equilibrium relationships among the concerned
variables is examined by the Johansen cointegration procedure. According to Johansen’s
trace test and maximum eigen value test statistics, the null hypothesis that there does not
exist any cointegrating vector among log EXPGDP, log RP and log ESUB is not rejected
at 5 percent level of significance regardless of including the administrative cost in the
measure of ESUB, as are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Although Tables 2 and 3 report the
cases without a trend term, the inclusion of a linear trend term does not change the result
qualitatively.

Therefore, we can conclude that the concerned variables are not

cointegrated.

[Insert Table 2]

[Insert Table 3]

Since the cointegration tests reveal that a cointegration relationship does not
exist, it is necessary to try the regression analysis based on the first differenced data.
Table 4 shows the OLS estimation results when using the first differenced data. The
coefficient of export relative price is revealed to be significant at 1 percent level of
significance and slightly less than one. The export subsidy in terms of provision of
export insurance in the current study is revealed not to be significant at any reasonable

level of significance regardless of the measure of export insurance subsidy, which is not
in conformity with the conclusion of most previous literature which argued in favour of
the effectiveness of export subsidy in export promotion. The difference appears to be due
to the ignorance of the non-stationarity issue in the previous literature. Even if a dummy
variable expressing the effect of change in the risk management system in December
1991, i.e. dummy = 1 if t > 1991 and = 0 elsewhere, is included in the right hand side of
the export supply equation, the results do not change qualitatively.

[Insert Table 4]

V.

Conclusion

The British share of export insured by export insurance system in the last two
decades has been one of the highest in the world. The current paper examines whether
export insurance subsidy provided by the British government has promoted export supply
in Britain, considering export relative price and export insurance subsidy as the possible
determinants of export supply. Unlike the previous studies revealing the effectiveness of
export subsidy in export supply, the current study examines the non-stationarity nature of
the concerned variables.

The unit root tests show that all concerned variables are

integrated of order one. Johansen cointegration test results show that all concerned
variables are not cointegrated irrespective of the measure of export insurance subsidy.
The empirical evidences in the current study using the first differenced data
show that the coefficient of export relative price is significant at any reasonable level of
significance and its elasticity is slightly less than one. The export subsidy in terms of
provision of export insurances by the government is revealed to be not significant in
increasing the export supply of Britain at any reasonable level of significance, which is

different from the conclusion of most previous literature which ignored the nonstationarity nature of the concerned variables.
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Table 1. Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test Results

variables

level form
(no trend)

first-differenced
form (no trend)

level form
(trend)

first-differenced
form (trend)

log EXPGDP

-2.216

-3.527**

-2.148

-3.416*

log RP

-0.627

-3.397**

-2.220

-3.295*

log ESUB(a)

-1.124

-4.753***

-2.322

-4.919***

log ESUB(b)

-1.036

-4.679***

-2.266

-4.843***

Note: ESUB(a) is defined as 1+(claim-premium-recovery)/export value. ESUB(b) is
defined as 1+(claim+administrative cost-premium-recovery)/export value.
*
**
***

statistically significant at 10 percent level of significance
statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance
statistically significant at 1 percent level of significance

Table 2. Johansen’s Cointegration Test Results on the Relationship among
log EXPGDP, log RP and log ESUB

H0: number
of cointegration equations

eigen
value

trace test
statistics

5% critical maximum
value
eigen value
test statistics

5% critical
value

0

0.545

20.112

29.68

16.537

20.97

1

0.224

5.143

15.41

5.326

14.07

2

0.017

0.331

3.76

0.360

3.76

Notes: The calculated statistics are those based on one lag and no trend term in the
data. ESUB is defined as 1+(claim-premium-recovery)/export value.

Table 3. Johansen’s Cointegration Test Results on the Relationship among
log EXPGDP, log RP and log ESUB in case of considering administrative cost

H0: number
of cointegration equations

eigen
value

trace test
statistics

5% critical maximum
5% critical
value
eigen value
value
test statistics

0

0.541

19.854

29.68

16.353

20.97

1

0.221

5.055

15.41

5.245

14.07

2

0.016

0.016

3.76

0.339

3.76

Notes: The calculated statistics are those based on one lag and no trend term in the
data. ESUB is defined as 1+(claim+administrative cost-premium-recovery)
/export value.

Table 4. OLS Estimation Results Based on the First-differenced Variables

constant

log RP

log ESUB(a)

log ESUB(b)

0.019*
(1.815)

0.920***
(4.718)

0.018*
(1.749)

0.923***
(4.622)

-2.334
(-0.422)

0.015
(1.031)

0.892***
(4.210)

-2.103
(-0.360)

0.018
(1.738)

0.922***
(4.620)

-2.508
(-0.455)

0.015
(1.032)

0.891***
(4.213)

-2.332
(-0.400)

dummy

0.001
(0.054)

0.001
(0.045)

adj. R2

D.W.

0.528

1.771

0.505

1.848

0.457

1.777

0.506

1.854

0.458

1.788

Note: ESUB(a) is defined as 1+(claim-premium-recovery)/export value.
ESUB(b) is defined as 1+(claim+administrative cost-premium-recovery)/export
value. Values within the parentheses below the estimated coefficients denote the
estimated t statistics.
*
***

statistically significant at 10 percent level of significance
statistically significant at 1 percent level of significance

